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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of corruption on ideological voting. Linking
previous studies of political corruption with theories of ideological voting, I argue
that when corruption is high, voters place less importance on ideology in voting
than otherwise. The reason for this effect is related to voters’ reduced perceptual
accuracy of parties’ positions and their low political efficacy in these contexts.
Using data from 97 elections from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems,
I show that in countries with high corruption voters factor ideology less in their
vote decision partially because they have difficulties identifying parties’ ideological
positions and/or they do not believe parties can implement the electoral programs.
These relationships hold when I control for socio-economic and political confounders,
or for voters’ increased likelihood of abstaining when corruption is high.
Keywords: Political corruption, ideological voting, perceptual accuracy, political
efficacy, hierarchical simultaneous equations models, Heckman selection models
11 Introduction
Scholars commonly assume that corruption affects elections in two ways: either by
reducing turnout (Davis et al. 2004; Slomczynski and Shabad 2012; Stockemer et al.
2013; McCann and Domınguez 1998; Kostadinova 2009) or by increasing retrospective
voting against the incumbent (Hibbing and Welch 1997; Peters and Welch 1980; Choi
and Woo 2010; Klašnja and Tucker 2013; Shabad and Slomczynski 2011; Zakaria 2013;
Fackler and Lin 1995; Manzetti and Wilson 2007). This paper extends this research
and argues that the effects of corruption on elections go beyond what political scientists
usually expect. Specifically, corruption negatively affects the magnitude of ideological
voting.
Building on previous studies on political corruption and theories of ideological voting, I
argue that prevalent corruption affects negatively the two conditions of ideological voting:
(1) that voters are able to identify the unique positions of parties, and (2) that they believe
that parties represent them in the legislative process. When corruption is high, people feel
alienated from politics (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Canache and Allison 2005; Seligson
2002; Kostadinova 2009) and from the policy making process (Theobald 1990; Della Porta
2000). Parties instead focus on clientelistic promises or allegations of corruption, and less
on ideological programs. In consequence, voters have difficulties in identifying parties
positions and do not trust that parties will implement the policy proposals. Hence,
they vote less ideologically. In like manner, electoral behaviour researchers show that
contextual factors that make ideological considerations accessible and the left-right scale
clearer, e.g. polarization and number of parties, increase the magnitude of ideological
voting (Lachat 2008; Dalton 2008; Kroh 2009; Singh 2010; Fazekas and Méder 2013).
Moreover, factors such as political efficacy and majoritarian systems, associated with
parties’ perceived high chances of implementing their ideological programs, correlate
highly with the magnitude of ideological voting (Kedar 2005; Karp and Banducci 2002;
Singh 2010).
2In testing the above propositions, I encounter nevertheless two methodological challenges:
(1) the selection into voting of those who turn out to vote when corruption is high, and
(2) the possible spurious relationship between corruption and ideological voting. People
may choose to abstain when they cannot identify parties’ ideological position or when
they they do not believe parties will implement the ideological programs. That leads to
selection bias when I estimate the effect of corruption on the restricted sample of voters.
In addition, socio-economic and political factors such as democratic experience, age of
party system, number of parties, or electoral systems correlate with both ideological
voting and corruption. Hence, the relationship between corruption and ideological voting
could be spurious. I address these empirical issues by using Heckman selection models of
turnout and vote choice, and by controlling for the effects of other macro confounders on
ideological voting in different model specifications at the end of the empirical analysis.
I test my claims on 97 elections in 36 countries, with data from all CSES modules between
1996 and 2015. The analysis is developed in three steps. First, I test whether corruption
has an effect on ideological voting by examining the cross-electoral variation of the weight
voters assign to their proximity to parties’ ideological position in their voting decision as
a function of corruption. Second, I put to test the effect of corruption affects perceptual
accuracy and political efficacy and then estimate whether the effect of corruption on
ideological voting is indeed mediated by these two. Third, I estimate the Heckman
selection model and other robustness tests of the effect of corruption on ideological voting.
The results show that corruption has a strong negative effect on ideological voting: in
high corruption countries (e.g. Albania in 2005) the magnitude of ideological voting is
on average by around one standard deviation smaller than in low corruption countries
(e.g. Finland in 2011). In other words, voters are 65% more likely to vote based
on ideological considerations when they live in low corruption countries than in high
corruption countries. Empirical tests also show that corruption strongly affects perceptual
accuracy and political efficacy, which in turn affect the magnitude of ideological voting.
3This study offers new insights into the negative effects of corruption. By reducing
the role of ideological considerations in elections, corruption undermines democratic
programmatic party-voter linkages and the role of elections in policy-agenda setting.
Without clear indications of voters’ policy preferences, parties can focus on non-policy
activities, including corruption, which weakens further citizens’ feelings of political
efficacy and reduces their ability of identifying parties’ ideological positions. These
implications are discussed at length in section 6. The next section presents a short
overview of the literature on corruption effects in elections. In section 3, I extend this
research to ideological voting and develop my theoretical arguments. Section 4 introduces
the data and variables, and section 5 presents the models and the results.
2 Corruption and electoral behaviour
More than a decade ago, Brooks (1909) said that “[I]in the whole vocabulary of politics it
would be difficult to point out any single term that is more frequently employed than the
word “corruption””. After all this time, corruption is still strongly associated with politics,
and people refer to it when they talk about misconduct and wrongdoing in the public
sphere. Seen as misuse of public power for private interests (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000),
political corruption implies that politicians favour certain individuals (their clientelistic
networks) and their preferences in the policy-making process, at the expense of the rest
of the population.
These traits of corruption have been found to poison public sentiment toward democracy
(Canache and Allison 2005: 106) and increase mistrust and feelings of alienation
(Della Porta 2000; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Seligson 2002). Citizens report lower levels
of trust in civil servants (Anderson and Tverdova 2003) and low political efficacy
(Kostadinova 2009). They are less confident in government’s ability to consider their
concerns (Della Porta 2000) and feel excluded from the policy-making process (Theobald
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These effects of corruption have been associated with low electoral turnout. People
participate less in elections when corruption is high because they believe that their vote
cannot make a difference (Davis et al. 2004; Slomczynski and Shabad 2012; Stockemer
et al. 2013; McCann and Domınguez 1998). When they vote, they are expected to throw
the rascals out, but this not always happens (Hibbing and Welch 1997; Peters and Welch
1980; Shabad and Slomczynski 2011; Zakaria 2013; Fackler and Lin 1995; Manzetti and
Wilson 2007). The extent to which corruption matters for retrospective voting depends
on partisanship (Ecker et al. 2015; Anduiza et al. 2013; Vivyan et al. 2012), the salience of
corruption (Choi and Woo 2010; Slomczynski and Shabad 2012; Shabad and Slomczynski
2011; Zakaria 2013; Klašnja and Tucker 2013; Burlacu 2014), or the type of corruption
(Klašnja et al. 2016).1
Electoral behaviour researchers have nevertheless omitted the effect of corruption on
other voting strategies, such as ideological voting. One possible explanation is that
if corruption increases retrospective voting, the magnitude of other voting strategies
declines. This view is based on the assumption that voters firstly decide whether to
engage in a punish-reward strategy and then factor or not their ideological proximity
to parties in the voting decision. Without clear empirical evidence of a chronological
sequence of voting decision making, it is hard to establish whether ideological voting
is conditional or not on retrospective voting. In this paper, I develop the theoretical
argument based on the assumption that corruption has an impact on ideological voting
independently of whether people punish (or reward) the incumbent for corruption. At
the end of the paper, I discuss in turn whether the new understanding of corruption’s
impact on electoral behaviour complements or challenges the old retrospective corruption
voting model. I argue that corruption erodes the importance of ideological voting because
it reduces individuals’ potential of identifying parties’ positions and because it dampens
1A review of retrospective corruption voting model is beyond the scope of the paper.
5their belief that parties can implement the proposed electoral programs.
3 Ideological voting and corruption
The ideological model of voting predicts that the expected utility of voting for a party
increases with its proximity to voters’ ideological or policy position (Downs 1957). That
means that voters are the most likely to vote for the party closest to them on the
ideological scale.2 The extent to which voters engage in ideological voting depends
however on two conditions: 1) that they accurately identify parties’ positions, and 2)
that they believe in parties’ ability to implement the electoral programs.
The first condition of ideological voting is based on the assumption that voters choose
among parties ordered on a common political space. In other words, parties need to
present clear policy platforms and voters should be able to place these platforms on an
ideological scale. If they do not know or are uncertain about parties’ positions, they
cannot vote ideologically because they either do not know which party is closer or cannot
take the risk that the party they vote for is in fact further from them (Page 1976; Alvarez
1998). The high cognitive costs of ideological voting makes this more likely among those
educated (Tomz and Van Houweling 2008) and with a high level of political knowledge
(Singh and Roy 2014; Jessee 2009, 2010), political interest (Singh 2010), or political
sophistication (Macdonald et al. 1995; Knight 1985).
As a result, ideological voting varies with the complexity of electoral and party systems,
that fosters or dampens voters’ ability to place parties on a common ideological scale.
For example, polarization, i.e. the degree of ideological differentiation between parties,
increases the salience of ideological considerations and, as such, makes ideological concepts
more easily accessible (Lachat 2008; Dalton 2008; Kroh 2009; Dalton 2010). Voters
2See Singh and Roy (2014: 91) for a short review of the empirical and theoretical tests the ideological
voting model withstood.
6can thus compare their ideological positions to parties’ positions. In like manner,
few competitive parties, ideologically distinct choices, and unidimensional competition
increase the magnitude of ideological voting (Singh 2010; Fazekas and Méder 2013;
Wessels and Schmitt 2008; Burlacu and Toka 2014).
A second condition of ideological voting, although less discussed in the literature, is
voters’ confidence that the party closest to their ideological position will be successful in
implementing the advocated electoral program. Either because of prospects of a coalition
government or of confidence in political parties, voters are more likely to vote ideologically
when they are certain that parties can implement their electoral programs. For example,
in majoritarian systems, ideological voting is more likely as voters can be more confident
that if in power, the chosen party will compromise less because the likelihood of a coalition
is lower than in proportional systems (Kedar 2005; Karp and Banducci 2002). In the same
way, individuals who find politics meaningful are more likely to vote ideologically than
those who think that the political process is distant and non-responsive (Singh 2010).
Moreover, programmatic linkages require ex ante credibility: "voters must believe that
parties will both remain committed to stated policy platforms if elected and have the
capacity to implement these platforms once in office" (Kitschelt and Kselman 2013: 1456).
In a nutshell, the magnitude of ideological voting depends on: (1) voters’ potential
to accurately identify the true positions of parties/candidates in relation to their own
ideological position;3 and (2) voters’ belief on parties’ prospects of implementing the
ideological programs.4 Political corruption affects each of these conditions. First, when
corruption is high, the electoral discourse is more focused on clientelistic benefits or
corruption blaming than on policies and electoral programs. In addition, the new
anti-system parties have not had time to develop clear and consistent programmatic
3I use the term potential as a composite term that includes the system induced uncertainty and
misinformation, and voters’ own skills and cognitive capacities.
4I use the term belief and not confidence to distinguish this second condition from political
confidence/trust. The latter is one of the factors that influences individuals’ perceptions of ex-ante
credibility of political parties.
7messages. Corruption also increases electoral volatility (Crisp et al. 2014) which makes it
hard for both voters and parties to predict future policies with certainty. Individuals may
also question the validity of policy programs and the true intentions of politicians in light
of corrupt lies and empty promises. Thus, when corruption is high voters’ potential to
identify parties’ true ideological positions as well as the likelihood of voting ideologically
are lower than when corruption is low.
Second, even if voters could identify parties positions in context with high corruption, they
have less confidence in the representation function of political parties, politicians, or the
electoral system. As already discussed, people do not feel included in the policy making
process when corruption is high, they distrust political parties, and have less political
efficacy. Hence, their reliance on a party’s chances of implementing the advertised policies
is lower and, as such, their likelihood of voting proximately is lower than in a corruption
free context. Although I expect the strongest results in countries where corruption is
systemic, corruption scandals in countries like the US and the UK have been found to
affect not only politicians’ evaluations, but also attitudes towards political institutions
(Bowler and Karp 2004).
Taken together, these claims generate three testable hypotheses:
H1. Citizens are less likely to vote ideologically in high corruption countries than in low
corruption countries.
because
H2. Citizens are less likely to accurately identify parties’ ideological position in high
corruption countries than in low corruption countries. (Perceptual accuracy hypothesis)
and
H3. Citizens are less likely to believe in parties’ implementing their ideological program in
high corruption countries than in low corruption countries. (Political efficacy hypothesis)
8Disentangling the effect of corruption on ideological voting,
turnout, and retrospective voting
One of the challenges of testing empirically the above relations is to disentangle the
effect of corruption on ideological voting from its effects on turnout. Feelings of distrust,
alienation, and low efficacy associated with corruption can affect both individuals’
willingness to participate in elections and the weight of ideological considerations in
voting. When corruption erodes turnout by increasing feelings of misrepresentation and
alienation (Slomczynski and Shabad 2012; Stockemer et al. 2013; McCann and Domınguez
1998), voters sample is biased towards those who feel efficacious or think that corruption
is low, which might then lead to biased estimates of the effect of corruption on ideological
voting. Without aiming to identify a chronological order of turnout and vote-choice (i.e.
individuals decide first whether to vote or not and then whom to vote for), I measure
the effect of corruption on ideological voting after estimating its effect on turnout using
Heckman selection models.
A second challenge is that a small magnitude of ideological voting could result from a high
magnitude of retrospective corruption voting. People could be voting less on ideological
or policy principles because their vote choice is driven by retrospective considerations, i.e.
punishing or rewarding the incumbent for its performance on corruption. It is still under
debate whether prospective and retrospective voting are complementary or exclusive
strategies, and whether there is a chronological order in voters’ decisions, i.e. they
vote retrospectively because they could not find a viable party close to their ideological
position or they do not vote for the closest party because they want to punish/reward
the incumbent. Without aiming to establish a causal order between ideological and
retrospective models of voting, I assume that the effect of corruption on the two conditions
of ideological voting are less dependent on voters’ retrospective voting. Retrospective
voting remains however a plausible alternative explanation and future research could
test, possibly in an experimental set-up, whether voters base their decision first on
9retrospective evaluations and then on ideological positions or vice-versa.
A third challenge is testing whether the relationship between corruption and ideological
voting is not in fact spurious, caused by third factors that influence both corruption
and ideological voting. Scholars of party-voter linkages have found strong association
between both programmatic and clientelistic linkages, and democratic experience, age of
party system, and level of economic development (Kitschelt and Kselman 2013; Keefer
2007; Lupu and Riedl 2013). Young democracies are characterised by high levels of
corruption, underdeveloped party systems, and electoral volatility (Birch and Wallace
2003; Powell and Tucker 2014; Tavits 2005). Parties cannot offer coherent, credible
policies when their ideological position is not fully established, while voters cannot identify
parties’ true positions. In addition, uncertainty about election outcomes and governing
coalitions makes voters in new democracies vote for extreme parties rather than the
party closest to their ideological position (Ezrow et al. 2014). Similarly, low economic
development increases voters’ uncertainty and their responsiveness to clientelistic political
offers (Kitschelt and Kselman 2013), and reduces the resources people can devote to
cognitively intense voting decisions (Lau and Redlawsk 1997).
Political corruption scholars have identified several other political variables associated
with corruption, which also affect ideological voting. PR systems are associated with
higher levels rent-seeking corruption (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005), but this
depends on the the type of PR system(open or closed lists) and on the district magnitude
(Chang and Golden 2007). In addition, centralized rather than federal states, and
presidential rather than parliamentary systems foster lower corruption (Gerring and
Thacker 2004). Likewise, high clarity of responsibility (measured by incumbents’ majority
status in the legislative) reduces corruption (Tavits 2007) and could also reduce ideological
voting. In order to distinguish the effect of corruption from the effect of other institutions
and political variables, I control for these in estimating the weight people attach to
ideological considerations when voting.
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4 Data and variables
In order to test my hypotheses, I use the electoral studies for democratic parliamentary
elections collected by Comparative Study of Electoral System (CSES) between 1996 and
2015.5 The CSES collects cross-national post-election studies since 1996 from more than
40 countries. I pool its four modules and after excluding elections due to lack of data
on corruption or other macro indicators, I end up with 97 elections in 36 countries.6
34% of elections in the sample are in non-European countries, 49% in Western European
countries, and 17% in Eastern Europe. In the second part of the analysis, the sample is
restricted to 88 countries because several individual-level indicators (e.g. income) were
not available in 9 countries. In total, there are 66 987 individuals who answered all
survey items of interest in those 88 countries.
Ideological voting and ideological proximity:
To measure the magnitude of ideological voting, I estimate vote choice models with
ideological proximity to political parties as one of the main predictors. The coefficient
of the ideological proximity indicates the extent to which individuals with an ideological
position closer to a party are more likely to vote for that party.
Ideological proximity is measured using a linear loss:
Iikj= -|RIPij-PIPkj|
It is thus calculated as the reversed absolute difference between the self-reported left-right
position RIPij of respondent i from country j and the ideological position of party k
5I exclude the studies from presidential elections because of the distinct nature of the voting for a
president. This applies to 12 election studies (Belarus 2001, Chile 1999, France 2002 and 2012, Lithuania
1997, Peru 2000, Philippines 2010, Romania 2009, Russia 2000 and 2004, Taiwan 2004 and 2008)
6For each indicator, the missing cases are presented in Footnotes. The countries in the sample
are: Albania Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay
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in country j PIPkj on the same scale.7 A party’s ideological position is calculated as
the average party position reported by respondents with high political sophistication
(those who answer correctly at least two out of the three political knowledge questions
in Module 1-3 and at least three out of the four questions in Module 4) (Gingrich 2014;
Golder and Stramski 2010). In countries where political knowledge items are missing,
party position is calculated as the average placement by all respondents. Measured on a
0-10 ideological scale, high values of ideological proximity indicate a closer proximity to
the party.
Vote choice:
The dependent variable in the vote choice models is self-reported vote in the current
election. CSES recodes both party-list and district vote, according to the electoral
system used in the year of the study.8 In mixed electoral systems, I use party-list
self-reported vote for all respondents who reported a party-list vote, and the district
vote for the others. Vote choice is limited to a maximum number of six parties for which
I can measure respondents’ proximity to, because CSES asked respondents to indicate
the ideological position of up to six main parties in a country, ordered descending based
on seat share. In countries where ideological position is reported for more than three
parties, I exclude the party with the lowest vote share in the CSES database. For these
parties, there is a significantly high proportion of missing values for party positions items
and a substantially low number of respondents who indicate voting for that party, which
in some cases impedes the conditional logit models to converge.
7For Japan(1996 and 2004) the left-right scale is replaced by a similar liberal-conservative scale.
There is no information on party position in Belgium (2003), Chile (1999), Russia (2000), Thailand
(2001, 2011), United States (1996).
8The elections are at the lower house in all electoral studies, except for Japan in 2004 and 2007 when
the elections were for the upper house.
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Corruption
Corruption is measured at the macro level using the indicator of control of corruption from
the International Country Risk Group. The ICRG indicator is based on the evaluations
of the Political Risk Group editors using pre-set questions about the political risk in each
country associated with different corruption features (i.e. excessive patronage, nepotism,
job reservations, favour-for-favours, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties
between politics and business).9 These are calculated using identical rules for all countries,
which makes the cross-national comparison possible. The political risks associated with
corruption are calculated monthly, and for the analysis, I use the average of the monthly
estimates from the election year. The monthly estimates are bound between 1 and 6, but
the censored nature has been found to dampen the effect of corruption on election results,
thus providing a more conservative test (Burlacu 2014). The initial values of the annual
average has been recoded to a 0-1 scale, with high values indicating high corruption.
At the individual level, CSES provides, in its second module, a survey item measuring
individual perceptions of corruption. Models with perceived corruption instead of the
macro indicator of corruption are presented in the Online Appendix (Tables 8-12),
for comparison and cross-validation. The reader should consider those in light of the
endogeneity between perceived corruption and vote decision, perceptual accuracy, and
political efficacy (see also Seligson (2006)).
Perceptual Accuracy
The first condition of ideological voting affected by corruption is voters’ potential for
positioning parties on the ideological scale. This depends on two factors: 1) voters’
cognitive ability of identifying a party position and 2) their (un)certainty with regards
to their perception. A voter might be able to indicate a party position with a 30 %,
50 %, or even 90% certainty. The level of certainty then influences whether they vote
9There are no data on corruption in Kyrgyzstan (2005).
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ideologically or not. CSES asked respondents to place parties on an ideological left-right
(or alternative policy) scale. They do not question respondents on how certain they are
about their answer. I thus construct the mediator based only on respondents’ placement
of parties’ positions. Nevertheless, those who are uncertain report parties’ positions with
error (Alvarez and Franklin 1994). Thus, the accuracy of individuals’ perceptions reflects
both how likely they are to identify parties’ positions and how certain they are about
the answer. As such, I use perceptual accuracy as a proxy of individuals’ potential in
identifying parties’ positions. Comparing voters’ assessments of parties’ positions with
the positions given by CSES country experts on the same scale, I estimate how likely
respondents are to identify parties’ true positions. I calculate perceptual accuracy as the
reversed mean of the absolute differences between respondent’s perceptions and CSES
experts’ opinions of parties’ ideological positions:
Perceptual accuracyij= −
∑K
k=1(|PIPkij−EPIPk|)
K
where k is the party whose position is identified by respondent i in country j (PIP ) or
by the CSES experts (EPIP ) and K is the number of parties each respondent placed
on the ideological scale. The variable is initially between 0 and 9, and I recode it into a
0-1 scale, with high values indicating high perceptual accuracy. I use expert perceptions
instead of the average placement of the most knowledgeable respondents, because the
latter could be biased compared to experts’ opinions in high corruption countries. The
measures calculated with experts’ opinions or the most knowledgeables’ placement are
nevertheless highly correlated (r=0.82), and the correlation with corruption at the macro
level is in both cases strong, above 0.5.
Political Efficacy
The second condition of ideological voting also affected by corruption is voters’ belief
on parties’ prospects of implementing their ideological programs. This is a function
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of political confidence and political efficacy. CSES does not include survey items on
political confidence, but it measures political efficacy. Voters are asked whether they
think it makes a difference who is in power.10 The variable is measured on a 1-5 scale,
which I recode into a quasi-continuous 0-1 scale for ease of comparison with perceptual
accuracy. Models estimated using the initial 5 point scale with ordered logit models lead
to similar results as models using the quasi-continuous measure.
Individual and Country-Level Controls
I control for a range of standard individual level characteristics typically used in
vote-choice models: partisanship, age, gender, urban and rural residency, education,
income11, and market position - e.g. employed, unemployed, retired, not in the labor
force. At the country level, I include an indicator of economic growth to control for
retrospective voting in the presence of no individual level evaluations of the economy
in all CSES modules.12 In addition, I control for macro confounders which could affect
both corruption and ideological voting: the level of economic development, democratic
experience 13 (in years) and different political and electoral institutions14: party age,
PR and plurality electoral systems, effective number of parties15, district magnitude,
federalism, presidentialism, and majority status of the incumbent in parliament. As the
sample includes a heterogenous group of countries, I also include a categorical variable for
whether the countries belong to Eastern or Western Europe or they are outside Europe.
Economic data is taken fromWorld Bank, democratic experience from Polity IV (Marshall
10There is no data available for political efficacy in Canada 2011, Switzerland 2007, Germany 2005,
Ireland 2007, 2011, the Netherlands 2002, Poland 2005
11Income data missing for Belgium (2003), South Korea (2012), Latvia (2010), South Africa (2009)
12Economic development and growth data missing for Taiwan (1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2012)
13No Polity IV data available for Hong Kong (1998, 2000, 2004, 2008)
14No political institutions data for Hong Kong (1998, 2000, 2004, 2008), Montenegro (2012) and Serbia
(2012)
15No data on effective number of parties for Belarus (2001 and 2008), Brazil (2002, 2010), Hong Kong
(1998, 2000, 2004, 2008), Japan(2004, 2007, 2013), South Korea(2008), Philippines (2004, 2010), Russia
(1999), Thailand (2001, 2007), Turkey (2011, 2015), Taiwan (1996, 2001), Ukraine(1998)
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and Jaggers 2012), effective number of parties from Gallagher (2017), and all the other
political variables from the Database of political institutions (Beck et al. 2001).
5 Models and results
The analysis is divided into three parts. First, I test the main hypothesis H1 that
corruption has an effect on ideological voting by examining the cross-electoral variation in
ideological magnitude as a function of corruption and other possible confounders. Second,
I put to the test the underlying mechanisms between corruption and ideological voting
by testing the effect of corruption on perceptual accuracy (H2) and political efficacy (H3)
and then estimating with simultaneous (reccursive) models whether these two are indeed
in the pathway linking corruption and ideological voting. Third, I estimate a hierarchical
Heckman selection model to test for the selection bias considering that corruption affects
not only ideological voting but also turnout, as well additional model specifications put
to test the robustness of the effect of corruption on ideological voting when controlling
for different macro counfounders.
5.1 Two-stage hierarchical model of ideological voting and
corruption
In the first part of the analysis, I examine the link between corruption and ideological
voting (Hypothesis 1). To do that, I apply a two-step multilevel approach (Jusko and
Shively 2005) because vote choice is country-specific with different parties in each election.
That means that it has as many categories as parties in the country and cannot be
used as a dependent variable in a one-step model. To measure ideological voting for all
parties in a country in an election, I thus estimate conditional logit models of vote choice
separately for each election in the data. From each model in the 97 elections, I then extract
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the coefficient of ideological proximity and its standard error. I regress the coefficients
against corruption and the macro confounders. Because the dependent variable in the
second-stage is an estimate, I apply Lewis and Linzer’s(2005) FGLS approach to EDV
(estimated dependent variable) models, which offer consistent standard error estimates
in spite of the variation in the sampling variance of the observations on the dependent
variable.
First-stage models are separate conditional logit models in each election for each
individual i and party j:
ηij = Vij = αj + βIij + γ
′
iXij (1)
where ηij is the utility of voter i from voting party j, Vij is a dichotomous variable taking
value 1 if the respondent i voted for party j , αj are the party-specific intercepts, β is
the unique coefficient of ideological proximity Iij, which is a party-specific variable, and
γi is the vector of coefficients for each of the individual characteristics Xij of respondent
i: gender,age, education, income, market position, urban residency (in countries where
it was included in the questionnaire). Models are estimated initially with ideological
proximity as the only party-specific predictor. In a second model, I include for robustness
checks a variable accounting for whether voter i is a partisan of party j. Partisanship is
excluded initially because of the "uncertainty about the validity of the concept outside
the American context" (Gingrich 2014)16 and the endogeneity of partisanship and vote
choice, especially in new Eastern European democracies.
After estimating conditional logit models in all elections, I extract the election-specific
coefficients of ideological proximity βs. These are positive (except for the election in
South Korea in 2006 where the coefficient is negative, but statistically insignificant),
with a mean of 0.55 and a standard deviation of 0.19. High values indicate that as voters
are closer to a party they are more likely to vote for that party. This is highly correlated
16Gingrich (2014) develops a similar analysis of the magnitude of ideological voting as a function of
the visibility of welfare states. Her sample includes only developed countries.
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with corruption (r=0.33). In a second step, I estimate EDV model of β in country k as
a function of corruption Ck and other macro variables Mk (economic development and
growth, democratic experience, effective number of parties, party age, PR and plurality
electoral systems, district magnitude, incumbents’ majority, presidentialism, federalism,
and West, East or non-Europe distinction). Based on H1, I expect a negative coefficient
of corruption, ζ:
βk = α + ζCk + θ
′Mk (2)
Table 1 presents the estimated coefficient of corruption from Equation 2. Model 1 has as
dependent variable the coefficients of ideological proximity from models of vote choice
without controlling for partisanship. Model 2 includes the coefficients from models
including partisanship. Model 3 is similar to Model 1 but excludes three outliers (Mexico
(2006) with a negative coefficient, and the USA (2008) and Spain (2004) with a positive
coefficient of ideological proximity, significantly higher than the rest of the sample).
Table 1: Second-stage estimates of ideological proximity on vote choice
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Full sample With partisanship Without outliers
Corruption -0.223∗∗ -0.244∗∗∗ -0.178∗
(0.071) (0.069) (0.082)
Observations 97 96 94
Log-Likelihood 88.965 89.111 69.335
R2 0.515 0.428 0.456
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Full models included in Table 3 in the Online Appendix
In all three models, the coefficient of corruption is statistically significant and negative.
The eroding effect of corruption is 0.22. In high corruption countries (e.g. Albania in
2005) the magnitude of ideological voting is on average by around one standard deviation
smaller than in low corruption countries (e.g. Denmark 1998 or Finland in 2011).
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5.2 Corruption effect through perceptual accuracy of parties’
positions or political efficacy
As predicted, corruption has a strong, statistically significant, negative effect on
ideological voting. I now move on to examine the mechanisms underlying this relationship,
through perceptual accuracy of parties’ positions (Hypothesis 2) or feelings of political
efficacy (Hypothesis 3). To do so, I test whether those who live in high corruption
countries are less likely to report correctly parties’ positions and to feel politically
efficacious compared to those in low corruption countries. A significant effect of corruption
in these two models however does not indicate that these are the mechanisms through
which corruption erodes ideological voting. A clear empirical answer of the mediating
effect is provided by jointly estimating the effect of corruption on ideological voting and on
perceptual accuracy of parties’ positions, or on feelings of political efficacy, respectively.
As such, I examine empirically first H2 and H3 and then put to test the mediation
mechanisms.
I start by examining the effect of corruption on perceptual accuracy and political efficacy
in two separate models:
Aik = α1b + ω1Cik + ω2Zik + 1ik (3)
Eik = α1d + ω3Cik + ω4Zik + 3ik (4)
Both perceptual accuracy Aik and political efficacy Eik are estimated as functions of
corruption Cik and a vector of confounders Zik. This vector includes all socio-economic
characteristics included in the control variables vector of vote choice models Xik except
partisanship. Instead, the vector includes a measure of strength of partisanship.
The expectations are that partisans with strong attachment are more likely to feel
political efficacious and place parties more accurately than non-partisans. The vector
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of confounders Zik also includes all the macro variables from the second-step vote
choice model: the level of economic development, democratic experience, party age, PR
and plurality electoral systems, effective number of parties, district magnitude, federal
state, majority status of the incumbent, its dominance, and the Eastern, Western, or
non-European distinction.
Based on H2 and H3, the expectations are that both coefficients of corruption ω1 and
ω3 are negative and statistically significant. As we will see later, the empirical results
support both hypotheses.17 This means that perceptual accuracy and political efficacy
are potential paths of corruption to ideological voting. Further tests are however needed
to support empirically the mediation mechanisms.
One option for testing the mediation mechanisms is using the first-stage estimates of
ideological voting from the previous subsection with country levels of perceptual accuracy
and of political efficacy as mediators, in a mediation analysis. The analyis would suffer
however of ecological fallacy and it would be hard to say whether indeed those who are
less able to identiy parties’ positions or feel that election results do not matter are the ones
voting less ideologically in countries with high corruption. A second option is including
the macro corruption variable and the mediators in conditional logit or multinomial
models with the pooled sample. To my knowledge this is not possible. A third option,
and the one I use further, is to simplify the vote choice models to allow a one-step
multilevel model of vote decision with cross-level interaction of ideological proximity and
corruption, that can be estimated jointly, in a simultaneous equation model framework,
with the above models of perceptual accuracy and political efficacy.
Simultaneous equations models allow to test whether the effect of corruption on
ideological voting is indeed indirect, through perceptual accuracy or political efficacy.
These models with hierarchical data are not new in political science research. Rueda
17Due to space constrains, I present the results of these models together with those from the
simultaneous equations models, later in the section.
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and Stegmueller (2015), for example, use the same approach with hierarchical data
(individuals nested within regions within countries) to estimate whether the effect of
economic inequality on the income gradient in redistribution preferences is mediated by
the fear of crime of high income individuals.
To simplify the vote choice models, I look at vote for the incumbent instead of overall
vote choice. Vote for the incumbent is measured as a dichotomous variable coded 1 if
people voted for the party of the prime minister in parliamentary and semi-parliamentary
systems, or of the president in presidential systems.18 The assumption of this new model
is that if people factor ideology less in their vote decision when choosing between all
parties, as results in the previous subsection indicate, they also weigh ideology less when
deciding whether to vote for the incumbent or not. The disadvantage of the simplified
modeel is that the new model does not allow to estimate the conditional effect of voters’
proximity to other political parties. The advantages instead are that I can estimate the
individual probabilities of voting for the incumbent across different levels of ideological
proximity and corruption, and I can test for retrospective corruption voting.
To measure whether ideology matters less for vote decision when corruption is high, I thus
estimate models of vote for the incumbent that include the interaction term (Cik ∗ Iik)
between corruption Cij and ideological proximity to the incumbent Iik. The new model
also includes a vector of individual level control variables Xik for each voter i in country
k19, as well as a vector of macro level control variables Wk, same as the ones in the EDV
models:
V ∗ik = α1 + β1Iik + β2Ck + β3Ck ∗ Iik + γ′1Xik + γ′2Wk + ik (5)
This is a probit regression of (latent) vote for the incumbent (Vik). The magnitude of
18A macro dichotomous variable, coded 1 for presidential systems and 0 otherwise, is included in
the model to account for differences in support for the incumbent party when the chief executive is a
prime-minister or a president.
19The vector of control variables includes the same variables used in models of vote choice (Equation
1) with the exception of urban, which has not been recoded in 8 countries. The results are do not change
when the variable is included in analysis.
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ideological vote is measured by β1 and the impact of corruption on it by β3. If the
assumption that voters vote less ideologically in countries with high corruption when
they vote for the incumbent is true, β3 is expected to be negative and statistically
significant. Although this would not be different from the results in the previous
subsection, comparing the magnitude of β3 with the effect of corruption after accounting
for the effect of perceptual accuracy and political efficacy on ideological voting test the
hypothesised underlying mechanisms.
To estimate the effect of corruption while accounting for the effect of perceptual accuracy
and political efficacy on ideological voting, I include separately the two mediators,
perceptual accuracy Aik, or political efficacy Eik, and their interaction with ideological
proximity in the model of vote for the incumbent:
V ∗ik = α1a+β1aIik+β2aCik+β3aCik ∗Iik+γ′1aXik+γ′2aWk+λ1aAik+λ2aAik ∗Iik+2ik (6)
V ∗ik = α1c+β1cIik+β2cCik+β3cCik ∗ Iik+γ′1cXik+γ′2cWk+λ1cEik+λ2cEik ∗ Iik+ 4ik (7)
The new models (Equation 6 and 7) are jointly estimated with the models of perceptual
accuracy (Equation 3) or political efficacy (Equation 4), accordingly.20 If perceptual
accuracy and/or political efficacy are in the pathway linking corruption and ideological
voting, the expectations are that the coefficients of their interaction with ideological
proximity are positive and statistically significant λ2a and λ2c, and the coefficients of the
interaction of corruption with ideological proximity in Equations 6 and 7, β3a and β3a are
smaller than β3 in Equation 5. In other words, if corruption has an effect on ideological
voting that is (partially) mediated by perceptual accuracy and/or political efficacy, the
effect of corruption left after accounting for the impact of these mediators, is significantly
reduced.
This is a simultaneous probit model setup, with the errors from the vote decision and
20The estimates from Equations 3 and 4 do not (and should not) vary when the models are estimated
independently or jointly with the models of vote for the incumbent.
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each of perceptual accuracy and political efficacy models correlated. I use an exclusion
restriction in the vote decision equation to achieve identification by including strength
of partisanship only in the models of perceptual accuracy and political efficacy. The
expectations are that strength of partisanship has an impact on perceptual accuracy and
political efficacy, but not on vote choice as there are no theoretical reasons to expect strong
partisans in general to vote for the incumbent more than non-partisans, unless these are
only incumbent’s partisans. I estimate the models using conditional mixed-process models
and maximum likelihood (Roodman et al. 2011). Given the hierarchical structure of the
data, i.e. individuals within elections within countries, I calculate standard errors using
nonparametric bootstrapping, resampling elections and countries (Rueda and Stegmueller
2015).
Parameter estimates of interest from Equations 3-7 are presented together in Table 2.
First, we see that corruption has a strong negative, statistically significant effect on both
perceptual accuracy and political efficacy as predicted by both H2 and H3 (Models 5a
and 6a in Table 2). The effect of corruption is higher than one standard deviation change
in perceptual accuracy and two standard deviations in political efficacy. In other words,
people in countries with high corruption are substantially more likely to misplace parties
positions and to feel alienated than those in countries with low corruption.
Second, perceptual accuracy and political efficacy have the expected positive effect on
ideological voting (the coefficients of interaction terms between ideological proximity and
both perceptual accuracy and political efficacy are positive and statistically significant in
Models 5b and 6b). Voters weigh proximity to incumbents’ ideological position more when
they are able to identify parties’ positions without error and when they feel that election
results matter. In other words, ideological voting is conditional on both perceptual
accuracy and political efficacy.
Third, corruption has a negative, statistically significant effect on ideological voting
in Model 4, but the effect is reduced substantially after including the mediators,
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perceptual accuracy and political efficacy, in Models 5b and 6b. While in models
including political efficacy, the interaction term between ideological proximity and
corruption is still statistically significant, in the model including perceptual accuracy
this becomes statistically insignificant. The fact that the conditional effect of corruption
on ideological voting is greatly limited offers support to the hypothesised mechanisms
through perceptual accuracy and political efficacy, but does not negate the existence
of other mechanisms through which corruption affects voters’ likelihood of voting
ideologically, for example retrospective corruption voting.
Table 2: Probit models of vote for the chief executive party and simultaneous
models of vote, perceptual accuracy and political efficacy
Model 4 Model 5 (SEM) Model 6 (SEM)
Vote a. PA b. Vote a. PE b. Vote
Corruption -0.052 -0.127∗∗∗ -0.102 -0.197∗∗∗ -0.517∗∗
(0.339) (0.036) (0.280) (0.046) (0.198)
IdeolPxCorruption -0.124∗∗ -0.048 -0.054∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.027)
Ideological proximity 0.226∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.051) (0.013)
Perceptual accuracy -0.077
(0.399)
Perc acc * Ideol prox 0.504∗∗∗
(0.067)
Political efficacy -2.926∗∗∗
(0.066)
Pol Ef x Ideol prox 0.032∗∗
(0.010)
Observations 66 987 66 987 66 987
Countries 88 88 88
Log-Likelihood -23022.455 29443.640 -22009.183
Country-election bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Full models included in Table 5 in the Online Appendix
A more intuitive understanding of the conditional effect on ideological proximity of
corruption, perceptual accuracy, and political efficacy is given by calculating the marginal
effect of ideological proximity in Models 4, 5b, and 6b (Table 3). Based on estimates from
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Model 4, I calculate the marginal effect of ideological proximity in countries with high
and low corruption, irrespective of the level of perceptual accuracy or political efficacy
of the respondent.21 Based on the results in Models 5b and 6b, the marginal effect of
ideological proximity is calculated for high or low corruption, and either high or low
perceptual accuracy, or high or low political efficacy, accordingly, because ideological
proximity is in interaction with both corruption and the mediators.
Overall, the results in Table 3 indicate that ideological proximity to the incumbent
matters less for voters in countries with high corruption than in countries with low
corruption, with significant differences also between people with different levels of
perceptual accuracy or political efficacy. Looking at the average marginal effects in the
first row in Table 3 in particular, from models without the mediators included, there
is on average a change in predicted probabilities of 3.4% points for one unit change in
ideological proximity (on the 0-10 scale) in countries with low corruption and 2.1% points
in countries with high corruption. In other words, the weight of ideological considerations
in the probability of voting for the incumbent is 65 % higher in low corruption countries
as in high corruption countries.22 In terms of predicted probabilities, that means that
those who are at the farthest ideological distance from the incumbent have a probability
of voting for it of 21%, but this probability increases by 20% points when voters hold
the same position as the incumbent. In low corruption countries, on the other hand, the
difference is of 34% points, with those who have identical positions as the incumbent
voting for it with a probability of 49 % and those with opposite positions voting for it
with a probability of 15%.
21The average marginal effects are estimated as the average of marginal effects for each respondent
using the observed values of all explanatory variables except for those in the interaction. The predicted
probabilities are also estimated using the observed values of all explanatory variables. The observed-value
approach is preferred to the average case approach, where all explanatory variables are set to their sample
mean, because it offers a better prediction for the population under observation and does not refer to a
typical, average case that might not even exist in the population (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013).
22A slightly stronger marginal effect is found when perceptions of corruptions are used instead of the
macro corruption indicator. See Table 9 in the Online Appendix.
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Table 3: Average marginal effect of ideological proximity conditional on the
level of corruption, perceptual accuracy and political efficacy, and their 95 %
confidence interval
High Corruption Low Corruption
Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI
a 0.022 [0.014-0.031] 0.034 [0.027-0.043]
b High Perceptual Accuracy 0.040 [0.030-0.050] 0.044 [0.036-0.052]
b Low Perceptual Accuracy 0.018 [0.012-0.025] 0.024 [0.017-0.032]
c High Political Efficacy 0.012 [0.006-0.018] 0.023 [0.016-0.029]
c Low Political Efficacy 0.010 [0.004-0.016] 0.015 [0.008-0.022]
The 10th and 90th percentile are used for low and high levels of corruption, perceptual accuracy
and political efficacy. Average marginal effects and predicted probabilities are calculated based
on an observed-value approach (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013), based on 1000 simulations
using the results in Model 4 (a), 5b (b) and 6b (c) in Table 2.
There are also substantive differences in the marginal effect of ideological voting at
different levels of perceptual accuracy and political efficacy. In high corruption countries,
one unit increase in ideological proximity increases the probability of voting for the
incumbent by almost 4% points when voters have a high understanding of parties’
position, and by half that effect, 1,8 % points, when they misplace parties on the
ideological scale. In low corruption contexts, the change in probabilities is of 4,4 % points
for high perceptual accuracy and of 2,4 % points in low perceptual accuracy. Likewise,
in countries with high corruption, the change in predicted probability of voting for the
incumbent for those moving one step closer ideologically is of 1,2% points when people
believe the election results make a difference and of 1,0% point when their belief is low.
In countries with low corruption instead, the change is substantially higher: 2,3 % points
and 1,5 %, respectively.
Table 3 indicates that when perceptual accuracy and political efficacy come into play,
the differences in the marginal effect of ideological proximity in countries with low and
high corruption are significantly smaller than in the initial model of vote choice without
the mediators. The magnitude of ideological voting is still higher in countries with
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high corruption than low corruption, but the prediction power of corruption is reduced
when ideological voting is also conditional on perceptual accuracy or political efficacy.
These results support again the theoretical expectations that the effect of corruption on
the magnitude of ideological voting is partially through perceptual accuracy or political
efficacy.
As mentioned in the theoretical section, one other mechanism through which corruption
reduces ideological voting is retrospective corruption voting. When looking at the effect of
corruption on vote for the incumbent in Model 4 in Table 2, it is however not statistically
different than 0, irrespective of the level of ideological proximity.23 That means that
incumbents are not punished more or less in countries with high corruption than in
countries with low corruption. The results are in line with Burlacu’s(2014) findings that
incumbents are punished or rewarded for change in corruption and not its absolute level.
Before moving on to robustness tests of the results from the last two subsections, I
present shortly the estimates of the control variables which have statistically significant
coefficients in the estimated models. In models of second-stage estimates of ideological
proximity on vote choice, economic development and district magnitude have positive
and statistically significant effects. In other words, ideological voting is more frequent in
developed countries and those with high district magnitude. Ideological voting is however
less present in countries outside Europe (coefficient negative and statistically significant).
These effects are however not found in one-step models of vote choice. The interaction
between ideological proximity and macro institutions is statistically significant only for
the effective number of parties. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive, meaning
that people are more likely to vote based on ideological principles when a significantly
high number of parties participate in elections.
23The effect of corruption on vote choice is depicted by both the coefficients of corruption and of its
interaction with ideological proximity. Thus I calculate the average marginal effect of corruption across
different values of ideological proximity. The average marginal effects of corruption across the values of
ideological proximity are plotted in Figure 2 in the Online Appendix
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When it comes to the effect on perceptual accuracy, the macro control variables which
have statistically significant coefficients are: number of parties, presidentialism, and
non-European context. Results show that voters’ ability of placing parties on the
ideological scale is higher in presidential regimes, but lower in non-European countries,
or when the number of parties is high. For political efficacy, the effective number of
parties, non-European contexts as well as presidentialism have all the same negative
effect on voters’ efficacy. District magnitude and Eastern European contexts instead
have a positive effect: people are more likely to say that who is in power matters if they
live in Eastern European countries than in Western European countries, or when the
district magnitude is high.
5.3 Robustness tests
I now turn to different robustness tests of the results and start by examining whether
the effect of corruption on ideological voting is not an artifact of people participating less
in elections in countries with corruption, because they feel less politically efficacious and
do not see parties’ positions on the ideological scale. For that I use a Heckman selection
model (Heckman 1979) and estimate jointly the impact of corruption on turnout and vote
for the incumbent. The modelling strategy and the full estimated models are presented
into detail in the Online Appendix (pages 11-15). The results indicate that there is
selection bias in the models of voting for the incumbent (the correlation between the error
terms from the turnout and vote for the incumbent models is positive and statistically
significant). The coefficient of the interaction term between corruption and ideological
proximity is slightly reduced in magnitude, but it is still statistically significant and
negative, meaning that corruption still has a strong eroding effect on ideological voting
after accounting for its effect on turnout. I thus conclude that although there is selection
bias in the voting for the incumbent model, this does not constitute a threat, at least
when it comes to the main focus of the paper.
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I also conduct a number of robustness tests for alternative model specifications for both
second stage estimates of ideological proximity on vote choice and one-step hierarchical
model of voting for the incumbent. For the former, I estimate first a simple baseline
model of corruption and then additional models with different groups of predictors: 1)
economic development and democracy for the programmatic-linkage theories; 2) electoral
and party specific variables; 3) government structure variables; and 4) models excluding
Eastern European countries from the sample (Table 4 in the Online Appendix). For
the latter, I include in addition to ideological proximity’s interaction with corruption,
its interaction with programmatic-linkage predictors (economic development, democratic
experience and party age), as well as electoral and party variables (effective number of
parties, district magnitude and electoral systems). I also reduce the number of macro
indicators to those from programmatic linkage theories, and run the models without
Eastern European countries. Furthermore, I run the model of voting for the incumbent
with country and year fixed effects (Table 6 in the Online Appendix). The results show
that the effect of corruption on ideological voting is robust to all these alternatives.
6 Discussion and conclusions
This paper is about the effect of corruption on ideological voting. Building on theories
of political corruption and electoral behaviour, I argue that the negative consequences of
corruption do not end with people abstaining or not punishing the incumbent. Corruption
has also eroding effects on ideological voting. Ignoring these effects would underestimate
the harmful impact of corruption in politics. When ideology is not a relevant factor
in elections, manifestos and policy reforms lose significance in the political spectrum.
Elections as means to transmit policy preferences lose their role, and representatives do
not feel complied to follow an ideological program because voters have not chosen them
based on their policy proposals. These weaken voters’ connection to parties and the
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accountability mechanisms and thus create the perfect environment for corrupt politicians
to follow their interests and not the party manifestos.
In testing the conditional effect of corruption on ideological voting, I propose and show
empirically that the mechanisms underlying this relationship are perceptual accuracy of
parties’ positions and political efficacy. Although, the results of simultaneous equations
models should be understood only as correlations between corruption, perceptual
accuracy, political efficacy and ideological voting, they indicate strong links between
corruption, political perceptions, and political behaviour previously ignored by political
scientists. Students of corruption have found that citizens’ understanding of the political
system is affected by corruption, but they only tested how this then affects voters’
likelihood of voting. Scholars of ideological voting have identified several factors that
affect voters’ potential to place parties on the ideological scale and their confidence in
parties’ ability to implement the manifestos, but ignored the role of corruption. Therefore,
the results of this study contribute to the two literatures and highlight the link between
them. Future studies could explore other possible mechanisms between corruption and
voting models, e.g. political confidence, which have not been discussed in this paper
because of data availability constraints.
Treated so far as mediation mechanisms, the effects of corruption on perceptual accuracy
and political efficacy also have important theoretical implications in and of themselves,
especially for research on the quality of democratic governance: by fighting corruption,
policy-makers can change voters’ understanding of parties and of their ideological
positions, and consolidate people reliance on politicians’ role as representatives as well
as their position as principles in the dynamic process of representation (see Dalton et al.
(2011), Powell (2000), McDonald and Budge (2005)).
Another significant finding of this study are the results from the Heckamn selection
models. I find that vote choice models suffer of selection bias, but the change in coefficients
of the estimates of interest is small. These results indicate that although people are
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more likely to abstain when corruption is high, this still plays a role in voting decisions.
Electoral behaviour scholars analyse the predictors of vote choice without considering
that those predictors could influence who is in the sample and thus bias the results. In
this paper, the bias is considerable but does not invalidate the theoretical expectations.
Future research should explore the chronological order of turnout and voting strategies.
Do people abstain because they cannot identify a party to vote for or the decision of
voting ideologically follows the decision of showing up to vote?
Going back to the novel finding that corruption erodes ideological voting, I want to
re-emphasize its relevance for research on programmatic party-voter linkages. For
voters, corruption reduces the incentives to look for the party closest to their ideological
position and thus they vote for the lesser of the two evils, either punishing or rewarding
the incumbent, without taking into account future ideological positions. For parties,
corruption reduces the ability to plan ahead if policies do not drive voters. This means
that programmatic linkages are eroded from both voters and parties’ sides, independently
of other socio-economic or political factors.
Before concluding, it is important to discuss again the relationship between ideological
voting and retrospective corruption voting in countries with high corruption. In
this study, I assume that corruption can reduce ideological voting independently of
retrospective voting. The two underlying mechanisms linking corruption and ideological
voting are thus based on the assumption that ideological voting is not necessarily an
opposite voting strategy to retrospective voting. In reality voters can employ different
voting decision mechanisms when corruption is high. First, based on the theoretical
expectations of this study, voters cannot identify political parties so they base their vote
choice on other strategies: e.g. punish the incumbent for high corruption or reward it for
pork barrel. Second, voters punish the incumbent for high corruption and as such they do
not vote ideologically for the incumbent, but they could still apply an ideological voting
strategy when voting for an opposition party. Based on my results from the two-stage
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estimates models, this is nevertheless unlikely because voting for all parties, and not only
the incumbent, is reduced in countries with high corruption. Third, voters reward the
incumbent for pork barrel irrespective of whether they are in its ideological proximity or
not, and thus they do not apply the ideological voting strategy either for the incumbent or
other parties. Based on the insignificant effect of corruption on voting for the incumbent
found in the second part of the analysis, the lack of ideological voting has not (been)
replaced (by) either the reward or punish voting strategies.
Last, the results in this study test the cross-national correlation and not temporal
causation between ideological voting and corruption. As such, one could think that
when corruption increases, people start voting less on ideological principles, or that less
ideological voting leads in time to more corruption. In other words, voters who base their
vote decision less on ideological programs could open the door to corruption for certain
politicians, which in turn increases corruption, and thus reduces the likelihood of voting
ideologically for other people. On the same token, voters who vote ideologically when
corruption is high could send a message to parties to focus on policies, which in time
could reduce corruption and increase the appeal of ideological voting for other voters.
The silver lining of this study is nevertheless that contrary to previous perceptions that
ordinary citizens are ignorant and they do not respond to politics adequately, I find that
voters adapt their behaviour to corruption. When faced with high uncertainty regarding
parties positions and the performance of corrupt representatives in implementing the
electoral promises, people pay less attention to ideological positions and electoral promises
when voting. In countries with low corruption instead, voters have higher confidence in
parties’ positions and their ability of implementing electoral programs, and as such they
choose the party closest to them on the ideological scale more frequently.
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